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Abstract
Patent examiners, who are often accused of granting questionable patents, might lack
proper incentives to carefully scrutinize applications. Furthermore, they have outside op-
tions and leave the patent o¢ ce. It is thus interesting to investigate whether their granting
behavior is a⁄ected by career concerns. In a simple setting, we analyze di⁄erent incentive
schemes that reward examiners on the basis of rejected and/or accepted patents. We then
study the e⁄ect of career concerns on the granting behavior of examiners. We ￿nd that a
reward based on rejection gives more incentives to search for relevant information, and career
concerns increase these incentives. Besides, the information provided by the applicant has
an impact on the examiner￿ s incentive to search for information.
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11 Introduction
Patent applications and grants have increased at an unprecedented pace over the last decades.
This raise in the number of patents is associated with many criticisms concerning the functioning
of patent o¢ ces and examiners are often accused of granting patents of questionable validity.
Even though some wrongly patented innovations have no value, others are valuable and, there-
fore, are costly for society and harm competitors.1 In the U.S., the Patent and Trademark O¢ ce
(PTO) is aware of the quality concerns that have been raised and is attempting to improve the
patent system with, for instance, the implementation of modernization plans. Reports on the
progress of these plans are regularly published by the U.S. Government Accountability O¢ ce
(GAO). One of the issues addressed in the last two reports (GAO 2005, 2007) is that the PTO
has a hard time to hire and retain a skilled workforce. The reasons for which examiners leave
the PTO are not clear, and the o¢ ce management and patent examiners usually have divergent
opinions regarding this issue. The former pretends examiners leave for personal reasons, whereas
the latter claim they leave because their production goals are too high, and have not changed
over the last 30 years.2 It might also be the case that examiners, who gain some expertise in an
area, have an outside option value and leave the PTO to work for private companies.
Because incorrectly issued patents can survive in the market, there is a need for providing new
mechanisms to improve the examination process. Several possible reforms have been proposed
and some are currently under careful scrutiny, and/or are implemented as pilot programs at the
PTO.3 Reforms that consist in increasing the number of examiners and allowing them to spend
more time on each application are ine⁄ective if they do not account for the high proportion
of valueless patents. More e⁄ective reforms involve either competitors, as it is the case of
the opposition system, or applicants, with the imposition of a two-speed examination process
in which patent applicants can pay more to get a better scrutiny.4 The proposed reforms
1See for instance Farrell and Shapiro (2008), Gallini (2002), Hall (2006), Hall and Harho⁄ (2004).
2A survey has been conducted by GAO and its ￿ndings are exposed in the last report from 2007.
3As explained in Shapiro (2004), Lemley, Lichtman and Sampat (2005) and Hall (2006).
4The opposition system is equivalent to the European system (Hall, 2006; Lemley, Lichtman and Sampat,
2acknowledge that patent applicants and competitors may have better information than the
PTO about the innovation and, therefore, should be involved in the patent granting process.
Even though applicants might be responsible for not providing (and possibly not searching)
information useful to judge the novel content of their innovation,5 patent examiners might also
have their share of responsibility. Hence, it is important to have a better understanding of the
mechanism by which patents are granted, and of the functioning of the internal organization of
the PTO. Since there are patents on obvious innovations (e.g., crustless peanut butter and jelly
sandwich), it is legitimate to wonder how examiners grant patents on innovations that seem
to have serious ￿ aws. One of the explanations might be that they lack incentives to make the
appropriate e⁄ort to search for information that will prove the innovation cannot be patented.
Even though the examination process is fairly standard,6 it is highly dependent on the ex-
aminers￿skill. The process consists of regular check of legal formalities, and search of prior art
￿ the existing set of related inventions￿which is where the expertise of the examiner is the most
important.7 Their salaries are tied to the number of applications they process: they have pro-
duction quotas to meet, and earn bonuses when they exceed their quotas by at least 10%.8 Their
production goals are based on the number of patent applications they review, their experience
(position in the agency) and their ￿eld of expertise (GAO, 2007). Importantly, they are never
liable in the event patents are invalidated in court and ￿there are no negative consequences for
2005). The two-speed examination process, also called gold-plate patents by Lemley, Lichtman and Sampat
(2005) or super patent by Lemley and Shapiro (2005) is currently implemented at the PTO.
5See Atal and Bar (2008), Caillaud and DuchŒne (2005), Langinier and Marcoul (2008) for analyses of strategic
behavior of patent applicants while searching and revealing prior art information.
6It is documented in the Manual of Patent Examining and Procedure, see the USPTO website at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/o¢ ces/pac/mpep/.
7According to Cockburn, Kortum and Stern (2003), there is a strong heterogeneity among patent examiners.
8They process an average of 87 applications per year and they devote about 19 hours per application spread
over 3 years. According to the PTO, about 60% of eligible examiners get bonuses. What is surprising is that
examiners claim that their quotas are too high, whereas more than half of them go over at least 10% of their
quotas (GAO, 2007).
3examiners who produce low-quality work￿(GAO, 2005). Furthermore, according to Quillen et
al. (2001) in the U.S. between 87% and 95% of applications are granted a patent. This suggests
that they are mainly rewarded on granted patents, and do not bear the aftermath of granting
questionable patents.
In a perfect patent system, examiners would never issue patents that would be later found
invalid in court. They would make appropriate e⁄orts, which would be observed by the PTO.
However, this is not the case. Due to lack of resources (both in terms of examiners￿e⁄ort and
PTO monitoring), it is obvious that such of a perfect system is impossible to implement. There
is a moral hazard problem since the PTO does not know how much e⁄ort an examiner makes on
each application. The PTO only observes the outcome which is the patent disposal (acceptance
or rejection). Examiners should be responsible for granting invalid patents, and should also,
to some extend, be rewarded according to the social value they create, or be punished for the
social loss. Even though it might be di¢ cult to implement such a system, at least their salaries
should be set to better re￿ ect these objectives.
Furthermore, as already mentioned, the PTO su⁄ers from a high turnover level. Some
examiners develop skills that are often sought by private companies that value not only their
technical skills but also their sound knowledge of the patent system. This raises the problem
of career concerns, and the problem of knowing whether patent examiners behave strategically.
When they process applications, they might account for the signal they send to the private job
market. Our goal is to provide answers to the following questions: How should examiners be
rewarded? How much e⁄ort an examiner will make to acquire invalidating information? How
will career concerns a⁄ect their incentives to search for information?
We design a simple model in which examiners are rewarded according to di⁄erent incentive
schemes. The PTO o⁄ers a salary scheme based on di⁄erent observable outcomes. When an
examiner receives a patent application he must decide how much e⁄ort to put in it. He does
not know the quality of the innovation and has only prior beliefs. His search of information
4allows him to ￿nd that the innovation should be patented (he cannot ￿nd any evidence against
patenting), should not be patented (he ￿nds strong evidence against patenting) or should not
be patented as it stands, but can be patented with considerable narrowed claims. Therefore,
by exerting some e⁄ort he is able to reject non-patentable innovations, or to narrow the patent
scope of too broad applications. A patent that has been granted can later be challenged in court
with a certain probability, and we make the simplifying assumption that the court systematically
invalidates patents granted on non-patentable innovations, but does not invalidate patents issued
on patentable innovations.
We propose di⁄erent scenarios. In the ￿rst one, the reward is based on rejection of a patent
application. In the second scenario, the reward is based on acceptance of the patent. Finally,
in the third scenario the reward is based on both rejection and acceptance. We ￿nd that the
reward only based on rejection induces more e⁄ort on the part of the examiner, and also makes
the PTO better o⁄. In our setting, rewarding the examiner on both rejection and acceptance
is dominated as both instruments are equivalent. We then study how the existence of career
concerns shapes the incentives of the patent examiner. To fully characterize the model we
assume that the examiner can be skilled or not, and that his talent is unknown not only for
the market but also for himself, which is standard in career concern models. The more skilled
the examiner is, the higher the chances of gathering relevant information. The market does not
observe the examiner￿ s talent directly, and has prior beliefs about the examiner￿ s ability. The
market observes patents that are granted (which does not provide information about the quality
of the examiner￿ s scrutiny) but also, and most importantly, granted patents that are taken to
court, and the outcome of the trial. From the observation of patents that have been challenged
in court and not invalidated, the market updates its beliefs. The market o⁄ers a salary to
the examiner based on the observation of patents challenged in court and not invalidated. We
￿nd that examiners with career concerns attempt to in￿ uence the market￿ s beliefs by exerting
more e⁄ort. Examiners with career concerns provide higher e⁄orts than they would absent any
5reputational concerns. Lastly, we analyze how the information reported by the applicant in the
patent application will a⁄ect the e⁄ort of the examiner.
In terms of policy implication, our analysis implies that the self-interested behavior of career-
conscious examiners reduces the granting of non-deserving patents and, therefore, their objec-
tives are aligned with the PTO￿ s objective. Our ￿ndings suggest that when ex ante the uncer-
tainty about the patentability is high, a tough post-patent policy (a high probability that the
patent will be challenged to court) and reputational pressure forces the examiner to intensify
his search e⁄ort.
As a ￿nal introductory point, let us come back to some of our main assumptions. We make
the simplifying assumption that rejection does not lead to any controversy. It is obviously a
strong assumption, and in reality rejection can be complex. In his Internet Patent News Service,
Greg Aharonian reports frequently lawyers￿complaints about the fact that patents are refused
on wrong ground, and that the re-examination process is time consuming, and an appeal is never
a good solution.9 We also do not take into account the problem associated with continuation
rules that are topical as the PTO in January 2006 has just proposed new changes. According
to Hall (2006), continuations accounted for more than one third of all the patent applications
￿led in 2004. Therefore, patent examiners spend a fair amount of their time on old patents and
not on new applications.
The paper is organized as follows. We brie￿ y present the related literature in section 2.
In section 3 we present the model. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of di⁄erent incentive
schemes that are o⁄ered by the PTO. In section 5 we study how career concerns may a⁄ect the
examiner￿ s choice, and the incentive scheme o⁄ered by the PTO. In section 6 we investigate the
e⁄ect of the optimal choice of information transmitted by the patent applicant on the e⁄ort of
the examiner. Section 7 concludes.
9Se the web site of Greg Aharonian at http://www.bustpatents.com/.
62 Related Literature
Even though there is an abundant patent literature, to the best of our knowledge, there exist
only a few contributions that are studying the process by which patents are granted. From a
theoretical viewpoint, a few papers analyze the strategic behavior of examiners. The granting
of questionable patents may be due to the poor knowledge of relevant prior art ￿the existing
set of related inventions. Langinier and Marcoul (2009) propose a model of a bilateral search
of information in which both innovator and examiner provide prior art information to prove
the novel content of an innovation. The main focus is on the strategic behavior of patent
applicants while searching and revealing information. Caillaud and DuchŒne (2005) also analyze
the determinant of patent quality but they are essentially concerned with the ￿overload￿problem
that the patent o¢ ce faces. Atal and Bar (2008) study the incentives of innovators to search for
prior art before and after undertaking any R&D investments. As in most of the patent literature,
these contributions assume that the PTO and examiners have identical objectives, and there
is no strategic behavior on the part of patent examiners who have congruent incentives with
the o¢ ce. However, it seems realistic to consider that they are not congruent, as the PTO is a
federal institution for which many examiners are working, with most likely di⁄erent objectives.
To the best of our knowledge, no contribution tackles the internal problems of the PTO and
takes into account the fact that examiners may have career concerns. This is the objective of
our analysis: ￿rst we want to investigate what should be the reward scheme of examiners, and
then study the e⁄ect of career concerns.
There exist a growing number of empirical studies that have started to open the ￿black
box￿of the process by which patents are granted. First, a few surveys have been conducted in
patent o¢ ces themselves, both in the U.S. and in Europe. Friebel and al. (2006) provide an
analysis of the objectives of the European O¢ ce, and the nature of its internal organization.
They study the way internal organization shapes the ability of the patent o¢ ce to pursue these
objectives. Cockburn, Kortum and Stern (2003) propose a detailed exposition of the U.S. patent
7examination process, and they provide empirical evidence that there exists heterogeneity among
patent examiners and in the examination process. Concerned with the overload problem facing
the PTO, King (2003) provides an analysis of the e⁄ect of increasing application workloads on the
recent performance of the PTO. He shows that, despite an increased workload, patent examiners
do spend, on average, the same amount of time on each application, but the pendency time (time
elapsed between the ￿ling and the granting of a patent) increased. Sampat (2005), and Alcacer
and Gittelman (2006) provide empirical evidence of the role played by patent applicants and
examiners in revealing information regarding prior art. In nanotechnology, Sampat (2005) ￿nds
strong evidence that examiners are less informed than patent applicants and they face particular
challenges in searching for information. On the other hand, Alcacer and Gittelman (2006) show
that many citations (prior art information) are listed by examiners, and that ￿rm-level e⁄ects
(e.g., experience of applicants, nationality) seem to explain most of the variance of examiner
citation shares (Alcacer, Gittelman and Sampat, 2009). These analyses suggest that patent
applicants and examiners do not necessarily have the same information, or the same incentives to
search and reveal pertinent information. Lampe (2008) ￿nds empirical evidence that innovators
conceal information about prior art that is closely related to their innovation, which validates
Langinier and Marcoul (2008) theoretical ￿ndings that applicants have an incentive not to reveal
the entire prior art.
Understanding mobility concerns of workers has been theoretically studied in managerial
career contexts. The theoretical analysis of career concerns goes back to the seminal paper by
Holmstrom (1982, 1999) in which he analyzes how an agent career concern may in￿ uence his
current incentives to make decisions. He studies the e⁄ect of time on incentives, and shows
that career motives can be either bene￿cial or detrimental to organizations depending on the
context. While Fama (1980) argues that career concerns will induce e¢ cient behavior and
discipline manager￿ s behavior, Holmstrom (1982, 1999) shows that labor market forces may
induce suboptimal behavior. More precisely, a manager will, in equilibrium, make decisions in
8order to manipulate labor market inference about his talent rather than to maximizing pro￿t. A
more general framework is provided by Dewatripont et al. (1999a) with multiple tasks and where
the e⁄ort may a⁄ect the agent￿ s future talent. In a companion paper, Dewatripont et al. (1999b)
provide an application that studies the role of career concerns for government agencies. Our
view is that, like in Holmstrom (1982, 1999), examiners are able to send signals through their
patenting decisions to potential employers in order to accelerate their career track. However,
it is unclear whether career motives of patent examiners will negatively impact the patenting
process. We examine the con￿ ict or complementarity between monetary incentives and career
concerns or implicit incentives.
3 The Model
We consider a sequential model with two risk-neutral players: the PTO and a patent examiner.
The PTO seeks to grant patents to deserving innovations and to refuse patents to non-patentable
innovations.10 It o⁄ers a salary scheme to the examiner based on one or several observable
outcomes. When the examiner receives a patent application, he makes a costly search e⁄ort
to determine the patentability of the innovation, and to decide on the disposal of the patent
case. The disposal decision is to either approve or reject a patent. At the outset, the examiner
does not know the patentability of the innovation (nor does the PTO), and has only (common)
prior beliefs. The innovation is patentable with probability ￿ or non-patentable as it stands
with probability (1 ￿ ￿). Among the latter innovations, some are not patentable at all with
probability p, whereas others are partly patentable with probability (1￿p). Hence, an innovation
is patentable with probability ￿, non-patentable with probability (1￿￿)p, and partly patentable
with probability (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p).
We now detail the examination process, before presenting the salary schemes o⁄ered by the
PTO.
10In the U.S. to be patentable an innovation must be new, non-obvious and useful.
93.1 Examination Process
The examiner receives a patent application that contains b ￿ 0 citations (which corresponds
to the prior art information) that are provided by the patent applicant.11 Then, the patent
examiner exerts a costly search e⁄ort e 2 (0;1) to ￿nd relevant information to be able to judge
the novel content of the innovation. Depending on the gathered information, the examiner
decides whether to grant a patent or not. When a patent is not issued, the examiner must
provide information that proves that the innovation is not patentable. When he decides to
grant a patent, he includes all of the citations in the patent description.12 Let C(e;b) be the
cost of search e⁄ort that also depends on the information b provided by the applicant, where
Ce(e;b) > 0 and Cee(e;b) ￿ 0, C(0;b) = 0 and C(1;b) = 1. To have a tractable model we
consider the following cost function
C(e;b) = e2 + eg(b); (1)
where the function g(b) is positive, whereas its derivative can be either positive or negative and,
therefore, so does Ceb(e;b). The rationale for this cost function is the following. If the examiner
makes no e⁄ort, he does not ￿nd anything and incurs no cost. If he makes a positive search
e⁄ort, he has to go through the entire prior art b that has been provided by the applicant.
This will a⁄ect his cost of searching for information. The more information is provided by the
applicant in the patent application, the more costly it is for the examiner to ￿nd information,
but it might be at a decreasing or increasing rate. In other words, the marginal cost of e⁄ort can
be either increasing or decreasing with the information provided by the applicant. For instance,
it might be the case that when the applicant provides relatively few but relevant information, it
11For the time being, we do not explicitly model the patent applicant￿ s decision. In section 6, we analyze the
applicant￿ s incentives to provide citations.
12In reality, the patent granting process takes on average three years. It is not uncommon that patent applica-
tions are initially rejected. Then, the applicant provides more information, more description of the innovation, or
he narrows the claims. But, what matters is that, at the end of the process, many patents are granted, some with
narrowed claims. So, here we simply consider the ￿nal outcome to grant a patent or not, after all the process.
10is enough to help the examiner to direct his research on the right path. On the other hand, too
much information might be very costly as the examiner has to go through the entire information
provided. In the analysis of the examiner￿ s e⁄ort that follows, we keep our model as general as
possible and we do not provide a more detailed speci￿cation of g(b). In section 6, we consider a
functional form of g(b).
The e⁄ort e made by the examiner generates a probability q(e) of ￿nding the nature of
the innovation where q0(e) < 0, q00(e) = 0, q(0) > 0. Hence, with probability (1 ￿ ￿)pq(e)
the examiner ￿nds that the innovation is non-patentable and rejects it, and with probability
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)q(e) he ￿nds it is partly patentable, and issues a patent on the patentable part of
the innovation. With probability (1 ￿ q(e)) he does not ￿nd any information against patenting
and, therefore, grants a patent. Furthermore, the probability q(e) depends on the talent of the
examiner, which is unknown to all of the players. The examiner can be skilled with probability
￿, or less-skilled with probability (1 ￿ ￿). The intrinsic talent of the examiner will have an
impact on the probability of ￿nding information. A skilled examiner who exerts an e⁄ort e
will ￿nd relevant information to reject the patent application with probability e. On the other
hand, a less-skilled examiner will ￿nd the same information with a lower probability ￿e, where
￿ < 1. Therefore, the expected quality of the examiner is ￿ = ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿). The more talented
the examiner, the higher the probability of invalidating the patent application. To keep our
model simple we assume that the expected probability of ￿nding the nature of the innovation is
q(e) = ￿e.
Finally, when a patent has been issued, there is a probability ￿ that it will be later on
challenged in court. If the innovation is patentable, we make the simplistic assumption that it
will be discovered in court, and therefore the patent will not be invalidated. However, if the
innovation has been mistakenly patented, it will be invalidated in court as the court will be able
to identify that the innovation should not have been granted a patent. If only part of the patent
is not patentable, the court will ￿nd it. However, from a social viewpoint, an invalidated patent
11provides society with a social value of zero.
The social value of a patentable innovation that is granted a patent is W, whereas a non-
patentable innovation that is wrongly issued a patent has a social value W where W > 0 > W.
Furthermore, an innovation that is non-patentable as it stands, but is partly patentable will
have a social value W if it is granted a patent on the innovative part, whereas it has a social
value W
0 if it is granted a patent on the entire innovation, with W > W
0. It is costly for society
to grant patents on innovations that are only partially novel.
Two types of errors can be made by the examiner: a patent may be refused to a patentable
innovation (type I error), or a patent may be granted to a non-patentable innovation (type II
error). However, because many applications are issued a patent, it seems that type II error is
more likely to happen than type I error. Good innovations that are not issued a patent will
obviously have an impact on society, but bad patents that are granted have a higher cost (e.g.,
litigation costs, reduction of competition). In our setting, we therefore consider that the PTO
is concerned with preventing type II error.
3.2 PTO Salary Schemes
Let us now be more speci￿c about what the PTO can contract upon. The PTO does not know
the talent of the examiner, or the patentability of the innovation. It can observe that a patent
has been refused or has been issued. In the latter case, the PTO will know whether the patent
has been later on invalidated in court. Therefore, the PTO can o⁄er a salary scheme based on
the rejection of a patent application or/and on its acceptance. In fact, the PTO should be able
to contract upon some characteristics of the patent, like for instance the number of citations.
However, to keep our model simple we assume that when the contract is based on acceptance,
it does not depend on the number of citations, and the examiner receives a ￿xed salary.
3.3 Timing
The timing of events goes as follows.
12￿ In the ￿rst period, the PTO o⁄ers an employment contract entailing a salary scheme to
the examiner that depends on rejection and/or on granted patent. The examiner accepts
or refuses the salary.
￿ In the second period, if the examiner accepted the contract, he ￿rst receives a patent
application. He does not know whether the innovation is patentable or not, and has only
prior beliefs. Second, he makes a costly e⁄ort to judge whether it is patentable or not.
With some probability he discovers that the innovation is not patentable and refuses to
grant a patent. Otherwise he grants a patent.
￿ In the third period, the granted patent can be challenged in court and invalidated.
4 Di⁄erent Incentive Schemes
We consider several incentive schemes that the PTO can o⁄er to the examiner. First, we examine
the case where the salary is based on the refusal of a patent. In order to reject an application
the examiner must provide information that shows unambiguously that the innovation cannot
be patented (e.g., it already existed, had already been patented). In our setting, the examiner
cannot refuse a patent to a patentable innovation, as it is based on hard evidence. Therefore,
the examiner should be rewarded for ￿nding information that proves that the innovation cannot
be patented. Second, we consider that the salary is based on the acceptance of a patent.
The examiner makes mistakes, and can issue a patent on a non-patentable innovation. If this
happens, the patent might potentially be challenged in court and invalidated. The PTO needs
to account for that possibility, and reward the examiner for patents that are not invalidated in
court. And third we consider that the PTO provides an incentive scheme based on both refusal
and acceptance.13
13This later case could be seen as the closest to the current system in which patent examiners￿salaries are
(partly) based on the disposal of a patent case. It is however not clear how issued patents are weighted against
rejected applications in the calculation (See GAO (2007) for a description of the salary schemes.) and, more
13Whether the innovation is patentable or not, the expected probability of issuing a patent is
Pr(approval) = ￿e(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)) + (1 ￿ ￿e)(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p) + (1 ￿ ￿)p)
= ￿ + ￿e(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p) + (1 ￿ ￿e)(1 ￿ ￿):
An examiner of average talent ￿ who makes an e⁄ort e ￿nds that the innovation is (fully or
partly) patentable with probability ￿e(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)) as he cannot ￿nd any invalidating
information on patentable innovation or on the patentable part of an innovation. On the other
hand, if he does not exert enough e⁄ort, he will not ￿nd any invalidating information because
he did not search enough for it. This is represented by the second part of the probability.
The probability of rejecting a patent is
Pr(rejection) = (1 ￿ ￿)p￿e;
as a rejection will only occur if an examiner of average talent ￿ makes an e⁄ort e that generates
a probability (1 ￿ ￿)p￿e of ￿nding invalidating information.
The higher the average talent of an examiner, the higher the probability of rejecting a patent
application. More talented examiners tend to ￿nd invalidating information given that it does
exist. Or, in other words, for a given application and a given level of e⁄ort, an examiner will
approve more often a patent application if his average talent is relatively low, i.e., ￿ < 1=2pe.
4.1 Incentive Scheme Only Based on Rejection
We ￿rst consider that the PTO only rewards the examiner for rejecting applications. When the
examiner decides not to grant a patent he needs to provide evidence that the innovation is not
patentable. In our setting, when the examiner ￿nds evidence that allows rejecting the patent
application, it is because the innovation is non-patentable. He gets a reward R when he has
been able to prove that it is a non-patentable innovation, and his expected salary is
S1 = (1 ￿ ￿)p￿eR; (2)
importantly, in the current system examiners are not liable in the case of a patent that is invalidated in court.
14where (1 ￿ ￿)p￿e is the probability of discovering that the innovation is non-patentable after
making an e⁄ort e for an examiner whose average talent is ￿.
The examiner chooses the e⁄ort level e that maximizes his utility function
max
e
U1 = fS1 ￿ C(e;b)g;
where C(e) is given by equation (1). Consequently, for any level of reward R given by the PTO,
the e⁄ort of the examiner is
e1(R) = 1
2[￿(1 ￿ ￿)pR ￿ g(b)]; (3)
where e1(R) 2 (0;1). The more information provided by the patent applicant, the higher
(respectively, lower) the examiner￿ s cost to process it and, therefore, the lower (respectively,
higher) the scrutiny e⁄ort if g0(b) ￿ 0 (respectively, g0(b) < 0). The examiner￿ s e⁄ort and the
information provided by the patent applicant are substitute (respectively, complement), which
might give rise to strategic behavior on the part of the patent applicant (see section 6). When
it is more likely that the innovation is patentable (higher ￿), the lower the incentive of the
examiner to search information to prove otherwise. Not surprisingly, the higher the reward R,
the higher the probability that the innovation is non-patentable (1 ￿ ￿)p, and the higher the
examiner perceives his talent ￿, the higher the scrutiny e⁄ort.




G1 = fW ￿ S1g;
where S1 is given by equation (2), and W is the expected social value of the innovation that is
de￿ned as follows
W = ￿W + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿e(1 ￿ p)W + (1 ￿ ￿e)(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)W
0 + (1 ￿ ￿e)p(1 ￿ ￿)W]: (4)
If the innovation is patentable, the examiner will never ￿nd otherwise. If the innovation is
non-patentable at all, the examiner can make a mistake with probability (1 ￿ ￿e) and grant a
patent to a non-patentable innovation, which will not be invalidated in court with probability
15(1 ￿ ￿). On the other hand, if the innovation is partly patentable, the examiner can issue a
patent on the patentable part of it with probability ￿e(1￿p). In the later case, the social value
of a patent granted to the patentable part of the innovation is equivalent to the social value of
a patent granted to a patentable innovation. The examiner can also make a mistake and issue
a patent on the entire innovation that will not be later on invalidated in court with probability
(1 ￿ ￿e)(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿). Anytime a patent is invalidated in court, its social value is null.
By a backward induction argument, we plug equation (3) into the maximization program of





￿ + !]; (5)
where ! = (1 ￿ ￿)[(1￿p)(W ￿(1￿￿)W
0)￿p(1￿￿)W] > 0 represents the expected gain from
avoiding to wrongly grant a patent to a non-patentable (or partly patentable) innovation. The
higher the gain from avoiding making a type II error, the higher the reward. Note that the
expected talent of the examiner decreases the reward that the PTO has to o⁄er. The optimal
reward is also increasing (respectively, decreasing) with the information given by the applicant b
and with the social value of a patented patentable innovation if g0(b) ￿ 0 (respectively, g0(b) < 0).
It is decreasing with the value of a patented non-patentable innovation. In other words, the lower
the social loss associated to a type II error, the lower the examiner￿ s reward. It is also decreasing
with the probability of ￿nding evidence against patenting and with the probability of going to
court.
Evaluated at the optimal level of reward R￿




4[￿! ￿ g(b)]: (6)
We assume that the parameters are such that g(b) 2 [!￿ ￿ 4;!￿]: The optimal e⁄ort of the
examiner depends on the probability that the patent will be challenged in court, through the
reward R. Indeed, there is only an indirect e⁄ect as the examiner does not directly gain from
having the patent he granted going to court. However, he derives indirect bene￿ts (or losses)
16through the expected social value he creates. The e⁄ort of the examiner increases with ￿ for
small values of the probability of ￿nding a non patentable innovation conditional on not being
patentable as it stands, that is, p ￿ p1 ￿ W
0=(W
0￿W). The social value from granting a patent
to a deserving innovation will push the PTO to increase R which, in turn, pushes the examiner
to increase his e⁄ort. On the other hand, if p is relatively high, that is, p > p1, it goes the other
way around. As ￿ increases, the marginal expected social value of the innovation is negatively
a⁄ected and, therefore, the reward is reduced, which induces less e⁄ort from the examiner.
As the probability that the innovation is non-patentable increases, the e⁄ort of the examiner
increases or decreases depending on the value of ￿. For a given R, the examiner always intensi￿es
his search as (1 ￿ ￿)p increases. However, as it becomes more likely that the innovation is not
patentable, the PTO does not need to increase R to provide incentives for the examiner to search
for invalidating information, and therefore R decreases. Overall, an increase in (1￿￿)p induces
an increase in the optimal e⁄ort if the probability to be challenged in court is relatively low
that is, ￿ ￿ ￿1. If ￿ is relatively small, very few wrongly granted patents will be challenged in
court, and therefore the marginal social value of e⁄ort increases as well. More e⁄ort from the
examiner will allow to compensate for a low ￿, and to avoid granting patents to non-patentable
innovation. On the other hand, if ￿ is relatively large, that is, ￿ ￿ ￿1, many wrongly patents
will be challenged, and invalidated in court. Therefore, in this case, the marginal social bene￿t
of e⁄ort decreases with (1 ￿ ￿)p, as more wrongly patents will be challenged in court.14
The optimal salary of the examiner is
S￿
1 = 1
8[(￿!)2 ￿ g(b)2]: (7)
The information provided by the applicant allows shaping the salary scheme of the examiner.
As sign(@S￿
1=@b) = ￿sign(g0(b)), the more information transmitted by the applicant, the higher
14Notice that instead of taking the derivative with respect to (1￿￿)p ￿the probability that the innovation is non-
patentable￿we could take the derivative with respect to p ￿the probability that the innovation is non-patentable
conditional on not being patentable as it stands. The results would be similar.
17(respectively, lower) the optimal expected salary of the examiner if g0(b) < 0 (respectively,
g0(b) > 0). In fact, two e⁄ects work in opposite direction. As the applicant provides more infor-
mation, the e⁄ort of the examiner increases when both the examiner￿ s e⁄ort and the information
transmitted by the applicant are complement (i.e., g0(b) < 0). However, the PTO reduces the
reward R given to the examiner as it does not have to provide more incentive to intensify the
search. Overall, the optimal expected salary increases as by searching more the examiner in-
creasing his chances of ￿nding more invalidating information. The salary decreases with the
probability of having a non-patentable innovation if the bene￿t from avoiding a mistake if the
innovation is non-patentable is larger than the bene￿t from avoiding a mistake if it is partly
patentable.
We summarize these ￿ndings in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If the incentive scheme is based on rejection,
1. the more talented the examiner, the higher his search e⁄ort, the lower his reward and the
higher his expected salary,
2. the higher the probability of a good innovation, the lower his search e⁄ort, the higher his
reward and the lower his expected salary,
3. the higher the probability to go to court, the higher (respectively, lower) his search e⁄ort,
his reward and his expected salary if p ￿ p1 (respectively, p > p1),
4. the higher the probability of having a non-patentable innovation, the higher (lower) his
search e⁄ort if ￿ ￿ ￿1 (￿ > ￿1), the lower his reward and his expected salary,
5. the more information transmitted by the patent applicant, the lower (respectively, higher)
his search e⁄ort, the higher (respectively, lower) his reward and the lower his expected
salary if g0(b) ￿ 0 (respectively, g0(b) < 0).
Proof. All the proofs are relegated in the appendix.
18Even in a setting in which the salary of the examiner does not depend on a potential trial
outcome, the probability of having the granted patent challenged in court a⁄ects the search e⁄ort
of the examiner. Because the expected social value he creates is impacted by a trial outcome,
so does his e⁄ort.




where the more e⁄ort provided by the examiner, the higher his utility. The equilibrium bene￿t
of the PTO is
G￿
1 = (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p)W ￿ ! + 2(e￿
1)2: (9)
The PTO bene￿ts from more scrutiny on the part of the examiner. As the probability of having
a patentable innovation increases, so does the gross expected social value of the innovation.
However, the e⁄ort of the examiner decreases, and the total impact of an increase of ￿ on the
optimal expected bene￿t of the PTO is not clear. It increases the gross bene￿t, but it also
increases the associated cost as the PTO must increase the reward to give more incentive to the
examiner to perform a higher e⁄ort. The e⁄ect of an increase of the probability of having the
patent invalidated in court is also unclear.
4.2 Incentive Scheme Only Based on Approval
We now consider another incentive scheme in which the examiner is only rewarded on the basis
of granted patent that is not invalidated in court later on. He gets a reward A for granting a
patent that will not be invalidated in court. With probability ￿ the patent is challenged in court,
and only a non-patentable innovation will be invalidated in court. With probability (1￿￿) the
patent is not challenged in court. The expected salary of the examiner is now
S2 = [￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)￿e + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿e)(1 ￿ ￿)]A; (10)
where the last part of the salary represents a non-patentable innovation that is patented because
of lack of evidence against it, and has not been challenged in court. The second part of the salary
19represents an innovation that was non-patentable as it stands, but was granted a patent on its
patentable part.
The examiner solves the following maximization program
max
e U2 = fS2 ￿ C(e;b)g;
which yields, for any given A, the following optimal e⁄ort
e2(A) = 1
2[￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ p)A ￿ g(b)] if ￿ > p: (11)
The e⁄ort is null if ￿ ￿ (p+g(b)=￿(1￿￿)A). As long as the probability of going to court is small,
the examiner has no incentive to make any e⁄ort. However, if ￿ > (p + g(b)=￿(1 ￿ ￿)A), the
examiner chooses to make a positive e⁄ort. Notice that the court acts as random auditor for the
PTO. In our setting, in absence of possible court intervention, the patent examiner would have
no incentives to search for invalidating information. The court will rectify the lack of incentives.
In our modeling framework, we could think about a random monitoring (or an internal quality
check done by the PTO) instead of the possibility of having the patent invalidated in court.
However, the introduction of monitoring would not qualitatively change our ￿ndings. That is
why we only consider that the patent might be challenged in court, which can rectify some of
the incentives.
The maximization program of the PTO is
max
A
G2 = fW ￿ S2g;





￿(g(b) ￿ 2￿) + !]; (12)
where ￿ = [￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)]=[(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ p)￿] ￿ 0. When ￿ is relatively small (￿ ￿ p), the
objective function of the examiner is strictly decreasing with the e⁄ort. Indeed, by exerting an
e⁄ort the examiner reduces his chances of being rewarded for making a mistake of granting a
20patent on a non-patentable innovation. Therefore, he has no incentive to make a costly e⁄ort.
The PTO does not o⁄er any reward and A = 0.
However, for higher values of ￿, the examiner exerts an optimal e⁄ort
e￿
2 = 1
4[￿! ￿ g(b) ￿ 2￿];
and his salary is
S￿
2 = 1
8[(￿!)2 ￿ (g(b) ￿ 2￿)2]: (13)
Before comparing the levels of e⁄ort depending on the regime (rejection or approval regimes),
we perform some comparative statics on the optimal e⁄ort and salary.
The more talented to examiner, the higher his e⁄ort for a given level of A. For low values of
￿, the PTO will increase A as ￿ increases, and therefore the salary will increase as well. E⁄ort
and reward go in the same direction as ￿ increases for low values of the average talent. For
higher values of ￿, this is no longer the case, as the reward A decreases with ￿. It is not clear
how this will a⁄ect the salary. The information transmitted by the patent applicant will have
the same impact than in the case of an incentive scheme based on rejection. As the applicant
brings more information, the examiner increases (respectively, reduces) his e⁄ort and the PTO
decreases (respectively, increases) the reward if g0(b) ￿ 0 (respectively, g0(b) < 0). An increase
in the probability of having a patentable innovation reduces the e⁄ort of the examiner, and
increases the level of reward. However, the e⁄ect on the expected salary is unclear. Finally, an
increase in p has only a clear e⁄ect on both the e⁄ort and the reward if ￿ ￿ ￿1. If the bene￿t
from avoiding an error for a non-patentable innovation is higher than the bene￿t of avoiding
an error for the partially patentable innovation, then both the e⁄ort of the examiner and the
reward are increased after an increase of p.
We summarize these ￿ndings in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If the incentive scheme is based on approval,
1. the more talented the examiner, the higher his search e⁄ort,
212. the more information is transmitted by the patent applicant, the lower (higher) his search
e⁄ort, the higher (lower) his reward and the lower (higher) his expected salary if g0(b) ￿ 0
(g0(b) < 0),
3. the higher the probability of a patentable innovation, the lower his search e⁄ort, the higher
his reward,
4. the higher the probability of having a non-patentable innovation, the higher the e⁄ort, the
lower his reward if ￿ ￿ ￿1.
It is also of interest to compare how the e⁄orts under the two regimes (rejection and approval)
are a⁄ected di⁄erently after changes in di⁄erent parameters. We ￿nd the following results.
Lemma 3 The examiner￿ s search e⁄ort under an approval regime
1. increases at a higher rate than in a rejection regime when the average talent of the examiner
increases,
2. decreases at a higher rate than in a rejection regime when the probability of having a
patentable innovation increases,
3. is a⁄ected in the same way by an increase in the prior art information provided by the
applicant.
When the examiner becomes more talented on average, he intensi￿es his search more if his
reward is based on approved patents rather than rejected patents. Yet, his e⁄ort is lower under
the approval regime. If it is more likely that the innovation is patentable, the examiner has less
incentive to perform invalidating search in the approval regime. Lastly the information provided
by the patent applicant a⁄ects the e⁄orts in the manner because it does a⁄ect their costs in the
same manner.
22The utility of the examiner is
U￿
2 = (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))A￿
2 + (e￿
2)2;
and the bene￿t of the PTO is
G￿




The bene￿t function of the PTO and the utility function are both increasing with the e⁄ort
of the examiner.
It is straightforward to compare the two levels of e⁄ort in both scenarios. The examiner
exerts less e⁄ort when his salary depends on granted patents rather than on the refusal of
patents (e￿
2 < e￿
1), even though his salary is smaller under the ￿rst regime (S￿
2 > S￿
1), and so
does his utility (U￿
2 > U￿
1) when ￿ > p. In a regime based on rejection, the examiner intensi￿es
his e⁄ort compared to a regime based on approval. If he had the choice between the two regimes,
the examiner would rather prefer to be rewarded on the patents he grants if the probability to
be challenged in court is relatively high. On the other hand, if the probability to be challenged
in court is relatively small, his utility and expected salary are null as he does not make any
e⁄ort if his reward is based on approval. Furthermore, the bene￿t of the PTO is smaller under
an acceptance regime compared to a refusal regime (G￿
1 > G￿
2).
Proposition 1 The examiner exerts less e⁄ort when his salary depends on granted patents
rather than on refused patents (e￿
2 < e￿
1). The bene￿t of the PTO is smaller under an acceptance
regime compared to a refusal regime (G￿
1 > G￿
2).
Therefore, the PTO should be more inclined to o⁄er a salary (bonus) that rewards refusal
rather than acceptance. Examiners should get rewarded on what is actually observed at the time
the patent is processed, which is the invalidating information that is contained in the patent
application. Furthermore, this reward does not directly depend on the observation of a trial that
will happen later on. Therefore, bonuses should be based on the mere observation of rejected
23patents that are well-documented. This will induce patent applicants to intensify their search
e⁄ort. However, examiners would rather be rewarded based on the patents they grant if the
probability to be challenged in court is relatively high (i.e., ￿ > p). They need to make more
e⁄ort in the case of a salary based on rejection, but overall they get a smaller utility out of it.
4.3 Incentive Scheme Based on Both Rejection and Approval
Lastly, we consider an incentive scheme in which the examiner gets rewarded based on both
rejection and acceptance, such as his expected salary is
S3 = [￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿e)(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e(1 ￿ p)]A + (1 ￿ ￿)￿epR:
The maximization program is therefore
max
e fS3 ￿ C(e;b)g;
which gives an optimal level of e⁄ort
e3(R;A) = 1
2[(1 ￿ ￿)￿(pR + (￿ ￿ p)A) ￿ g(b)]:
This e⁄ort depends on the reward from granting patents A and from rejecting patents R. It
is no longer necessary that ￿ ￿ p to have a positive e⁄ort, given A and R. Here again, the
e⁄ort is decreasing in b. For given values of A and R, we can compare the di⁄erent levels of
e⁄ort of the examiner. If g(b) > 0 and ￿ ￿ p, e2(A) < e3(R;A) ￿ e1(R), whereas if ￿ > p,










There exist no R and A solutions of this maximization program and therefore the PTO o⁄ers
the following contract
A￿
3 = 0; and R￿
3 = R￿
1;
24which is nothing but the ￿rst incentive scheme that only depends on the refusal. In fact, the
two instruments are equivalent and rewarding the examiner on both refusal and acceptance does




Between o⁄ering a contract based on refusal, refusal and acceptance and only acceptance, the
PTO prefers to o⁄er a salary only based on refusal. By doing so it does not reward the examiner
for making mistakes, and gives him incentive to put on more e⁄ort to search for information
that permits to refuse a patent.
Proposition 2 A salary based on disposal (rejection and acceptance) does not provide more
incentive than a salary only based on refusal.
5 Career Concerns of Patent Examiners
As mentioned in the introduction, the PTO has a hard time to retain a skilled workforce and
skilled examiners tend to leave the PTO to work for private companies (GAO, 2005, 2007).
Therefore, we wonder how these problems of career concerns a⁄ect the e⁄ort made by examiners.
To analyze that, we need to modify our setting in the following way. The timing is now as follows.
In the ￿rst period (identical to our previous setting), the PTO o⁄ers an incentive scheme to the
examiner based on rejection. The examiner receives a patent application, chooses a level of
e⁄ort to ￿nd information that proves that the innovation is not patentable. Then he decides to
grant a patent or not. In the second period, the private market observes whether a patent has
been invalidated in court or not, and updates its beliefs about the ability of the examiner. The
private market then makes an o⁄er to an examiner who is believed to be a good examiner.
Let us ￿rst consider the second period. Using Bayes￿rule, the private market updated beliefs
concerning the ability of the examiner are
b ￿ =
￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e(1 ￿ p)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e(1 ￿ p)
: (15)
25Recall that ￿ represents the probability that an examiner is skilled, which is unknown to all play-
ers. After making an e⁄ort e, a skilled examiner ￿nds invalidated information with probability
e, whereas a less-skilled examiner will ￿nd it only with probability ￿e where ￿ < 1. The average
talent of an examiner is ￿ = ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿). By exerting more e⁄ort, the examiner attempts to
manipulate the market￿ s beliefs as @b ￿=@e > 0.
We assume that the salary o⁄ered by the private market is based on its updated beliefs about
the ability of the examiner. The market o⁄ers a salary b ￿ to examiners whose patents have not
been invalidated in court. For examiners whose patents have been successfully challenged, or
have not been challenged, the private market does not make any o⁄er.
We now turn to the ￿rst period choice of e⁄ort of the examiner in presence of career concerns.
It is solution of
max
e f(1 ￿ ￿)p￿eR + ￿[￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)￿e￿]b ￿(e) ￿ C(e;b)g;
where ￿￿ represents the probability that a patentable innovation will be challenged in court and
not invalidated, whereas (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)￿e￿ represents the probability that a patented innova-
tion that was partly patentable will be challenged and not invalidated in court. Therefore, an
examiner whose patent has been challenged but not invalidated receives a salary b ￿ whereas an
examiner whose patent has been challenged and invalidated does not receive any o⁄er from the
market. The parameter ￿ represents the discount factor.
For a given level R, the examiner￿ s e⁄ort is
ecc(R) = 1
2[￿(1 ￿ ￿)pR + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)￿￿￿ ￿ g(b)]: (16)
In presence of career concerns, for a given level of R, the examiner intensi￿es his search e⁄ort
(ecc(R) > e1(R)).





￿ + ! ￿ ￿￿
￿(1￿p)(1￿￿)
￿ ]:
26The optimal reward can be decomposed into two terms: the ￿rst term is related to monetary
incentive whereas the second one is related to career concerns (non-monetary incentives). In-
terestingly, if career concerns have an important impact, the optimal reward is reduced. The
PTO does not need to reward the examiner as much as before, as the market will give him extra
incentives to search for information. Up to some point, it becomes unnecessary to provide the
examiner with monetary incentives.




4[￿! ￿ g(b) + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿￿]: (17)
By comparing equations (6) and (17) we ￿nd that e￿
cc > e￿
1, that is, an examiner with career
concerns always exerts more e⁄ort than without career concerns.
Proposition 3 Monetary and implicit incentives make the patent examiner intensify his search
of information.
By doing so he gets more immediate reward from non-patentable innovations that are refused,
and also he increases his chances of being discovered as a skilled examiner on the job market.
The existence of outside option value makes examiners more e¢ cient.
We now perform some comparative statics and analyze how changes in di⁄erent parameters
a⁄ect the e⁄orts of the examiner with and without career concerns. Some e⁄ects are magni￿ed
by career concerns. Not surprisingly, as the average talent of the examiner increases, so does
his e⁄ort, but at a higher rate when he has career concerns. As his average talent increases, an
examiner wants to signal it to the market. As the probability of having a patentable innovation
increases, both e⁄orts decrease, at a more rapid path in the presence of career concerns. As it
becomes more likely that the innovation is patentable, the examiner does not have to search for
invalidating information.
We consider how the e⁄ort will be a⁄ected by a change in the probability to be challenged
in court ￿, for di⁄erent values of the probability of having a non-patentable innovation, p.
27For very low values of p, that is, p 2 (0;p1), it is more likely that the innovation is (partly)
patentable, and the examiner intensi￿es his search as ￿ increases, at a higher rate in the presence
of career concerns. Indeed, the examiner has more to win when the patent goes to court and
is not invalidated. For intermediate values of p, that is, p 2 (p1;pcc), it is less likely that the
innovation is patentable, and therefore an examiner without career concerns reduces his search
e⁄ort as the probability to be invalidated in court increases. On the other hand, in the presence
of career concerns, the prospect of sending a signal to the market is still high enough for the
examiner to intensify his search. So, in this case, career concerns boost incentives to search
even though the likelihood to be challenged in court increases. However, when it becomes very
likely that the innovation is non patentable, both e⁄orts decrease with ￿, as the patent has more
chances to be invalidated in court.
We now consider that ￿ is given, and we let p(1 ￿ ￿) increase. For low values of ￿; that
is, ￿ 2 (0;￿cc), both e⁄orts increase with p. As the probability of having a non-patentable
innovation increases, so do the e⁄orts when the chances of being challenged in court are very
low. When ￿ reaches intermediate values, that is, ￿ 2 (￿cc;￿1), even though in absence of career
concerns the examiner would still intensify his search, he does not do it anymore in the presence
of career concerns as the chances of sending a bad signal to the market are too high. Lastly,
for high values of ￿, both e⁄orts decrease with p. We summarize these ￿ndings in the following
lemma.
Lemma 4 The optimal e⁄ort of an examiner with career concerns








3. increases with the probability of the patent being challenged in court, while the e⁄ort without
28career concerns decreases, for intermediate values of p; that is, p 2 (p1;pcc),
4. decreases with the probability that the innovation is not patentable, while the e⁄ort without
career concerns increases, for intermediate values of ￿, that is, ￿ 2 (￿cc;￿1).
These ￿ndings suggest that when the uncertainty about the patentability of an innovation is
rather high (intermediate values of p), a tough post-patent policy (a high probability of having
the patent challenged in court) and reputational pressure will push the examiner to better
scrutinize the patent application.
6 Applicant Incentives
In the previous sections, the prior art information provided by the applicant was exogenously
given. We now consider that, at the outset of the game, the patent applicant chooses the
information that will be included in the patent application, and we derive the applicant￿ s optimal
choice b￿. Then, we investigate how the examiner e⁄ort and the prior art information provided
by the applicant are related.
6.1 Revelation of prior art by the applicant
First, we need to be more speci￿c about the private value of the patented innovation. We denote
V the private value of a patented patentable innovation, V the private value of a patented non-
patentable innovation and v the private value of a partly patented innovation, with V > V >
v > 0. The applicant would prefer to obtain a patent on its entire innovation even though it
is not entirely new, rather than having a patent only on the patentable part of it, as he gets a
larger monopoly power when he is granted a broader patent. Furthermore, the acquisition of
information for the innovator is also costly. We assume that the cost to search and provide the
prior art information b is c(b) where c0(b) > 0 and c00(b) ￿ 0. The shape of the cost function
is related to the ease with which the applicant ￿nds prior art information. The usual convex
29cost function (c00(b) < 0) could represent an innovation for which there is relatively few prior
art information and, therefore, it becomes more costly for the applicant to ￿nd more prior art
information. On the other hand, a linear cost function (c00(b) = 0) could represent an innovation
for which there is abundant prior art information, and the marginal cost of ￿nding prior art is
constant.
If we consider that the PTO rewards the examiner based on rejection,15 the applicant chooses
b that solves the following program16
max
b
￿(b) = fV (e￿
1(b)) ￿ c(b)g;
where the expected value of the patented innovation is
V (e) = ￿V + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿e(1 ￿ p)v + (1 ￿ ￿e)(1 ￿ ￿)V ]: (18)
With probability ￿ the innovation is patentable, and the applicant obtains V . On the other
hand, with probability (1￿￿) the innovation is either partly patentable and discovered as such,
or is not patentable at all, but this is not discovered by the patent examiner. Therefore the
applicant can get a patent on a patentable part of the innovation, or can be wrongly granted
a patent on a non-patentable innovation, that does not go to court and is never invalidated in







db = 0: (19)
With the speci￿ed optimal level of e⁄ort (6), and by using equation (18), we obtain the following
￿rst order condition
￿
4￿g0(b) ￿ c0(b) = 0; (20)
15The optimal level of e⁄ort is however identical if the reward is based on acceptance. Only the expected bene￿t
and the reward will be di⁄erent. We consider the reward based on rejection as this is the most e¢ cient policy.
16We abstract from patenting costs that would be a ￿xed cost.
17The second order condition is satis￿ed if g
00(b) ￿ 0 and c
00(b) > 0 or g
00(b) < 0 and c
00(b) ￿ 0 as long as ￿ > 0.
If ￿ < 0, then g
00(b) = 0 and c
00(b) > 0 must be satis￿ed.
30where ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)V ￿ (1 ￿ p)v] > 0 if ￿ < 1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)v=V . As long as sign(￿) =
sign(g0(b)) there exists a positive solution b￿. On the other hand, if sign(￿) 6= sign(g0(b)) the
applicant does not provide any prior art information, b￿ = 0. The sign of g0(b) has an impact
on the optimal level of e⁄ort e￿
1 of the examiner as seen in equation (6). When g0(b) > 0,
the more prior art information provided by the applicant, the lower the optimal e⁄ort of the
examiner. In some sense, the e⁄ort of the applicant to provide prior art information and the
examiner￿ s e⁄ort are substitute. In the same vein, when g0(b) < 0, they are complement as the
more information provided by the applicant, the higher the e⁄ort of the examiner to search for
invalidating information. In fact, because the applicant provides b before the examiner chooses
his e⁄ort, e￿
1(b) is a best response function to any choice b made by the applicant. For any level b,
the best response function will be a⁄ected di⁄erently by changes in the parameters of the model.
Furthermore, the sign of ￿ will impact di⁄erently @V (e)=@e. If ￿ > 0 (respectively, ￿ < 0), an
increase in the e⁄ort of the examiner negatively (respectively, positively) impact the expected
payo⁄ of the applicant. Hence, the applicant will have di⁄erent incentives to provide prior art
information depending on whether his transmission of information will increase or decrease his
expected payo⁄.
Provided that a positive solution exists, we perform some comparative static analysis on b￿
by taking the total di⁄erentiation of equation (20). An increase in the probability of having a
patentable innovation ￿ always induces the applicant to provide less prior art information b￿,
even though it does a⁄ect di⁄erently the applicant￿ s payo⁄ depending on whether ￿ is positive
or negative. In the former case, the probability to be challenged in court is relatively small
(￿ > 0) and both e⁄orts to provide information for the applicant and to search for invalidating
information for the examiner are substitute (g0(b) > 0). An increase in ￿ has a direct and an
indirect e⁄ect on ￿(b￿). Indeed, by using the envelop theorem, the total di⁄erentiation of ￿(b￿)









31Therefore, an increase in ￿ has a positive direct e⁄ect on the expected private value of the
innovation (dV=d￿ > 0). As the innovation is more likely to be patentable, it increases its
expected private value. On the other hand, an increase in ￿ triggers a decrease in the best
response function e￿
1(b), which means that, for any value of b, the examiner will exert less e⁄ort.
This reduction in the examiner￿ s e⁄ort has a positive indirect e⁄ect on the expected private
value. As the examiner makes less e⁄ort, the chances that the applicant is granted a patent on
a non-patentable innovation increases, and so does the expected private value. Overall, in this
case, an increase in ￿ always makes the applicant better o⁄. In the later case, the probability
of being challenged in court is relatively high (￿ < 0) and the e⁄orts of both the applicant and
the examiner are complement (g0(b) < 0). The direct e⁄ect on the expected private value can be
positive of negative (depending on the value of ￿). In fact, as the innovation is more likely to
be patentable it still increases the expected value of the innovation. However, because ￿ is now
relatively high, it is less likely that the applicant will be wrongly granted a patent. Furthermore,
the indirect e⁄ect through the e⁄ort of the examiner is always negative. Overall, it is not clear
whether the expected payo⁄ will be reduced or not as ￿ increases.
As the average talent of the examiner increases, so does the information provided by the
applicant. When ￿ increases, for any given b the best response function e￿
1(b) increases as well.
When ￿ > 0, an increase in ￿ has a negative direct impact on the expected private value of the
innovation as well as a negative indirect impact through e￿
1(b). Overall, the more talented the
examiner on average, the lower the expected bene￿t of the applicant. Therefore, by increasing
b the applicant forces the examiner to reduce his e⁄ort, which increase the expected private
value. On the other hand, when ￿ < 0, both the direct e⁄ect and the indirect e⁄ect have a
positive impact on the expected private value. Hence, the applicant bene￿t from a more talented
examiner, The applicant increases b which also increases the expected private value.
As the probability of having a non-patentable innovation conditional on not being entirely
patentable, p, increases, so does the prior art information transmitted by the applicant if g0(b) >
320. On the other hand, if g0(b) < 0, the applicant reduces the prior art information transmitted.
In terms of the expected bene￿t, with arguments similar to those presented above, the applicant￿ s
payo⁄ decreases with p, if ￿ ￿ ￿1 and ￿ > 0, or if ￿ > ￿1 and ￿ < 0. The applicant does not
bene￿t from an increase in p. For all other con￿gurations of parameters, we cannot conclude.
As the probability that the patent will be challenged in court increases, the applicant transmits
less (more) information if g0(b) > 0 (g0(b) < 0). In terms of payo⁄, as long as p > p1 and ￿ > 0,
or p ￿ p1 and ￿ < 0, an increase in ￿ has a negative impact on the expected value of the
innovation. For all others con￿guration, we cannot conclude.
We summarize these ￿ndings in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Provided that sign(￿) = sign(g0(b)),
1. the higher the probability of a patentable innovation, the less prior art information is
provided by the applicant,
2. the more talented the examiner, the more prior art information is provided by the applicant,
3. the higher the probability of having a non-patentable innovation, the more (respectively,
less) prior art information transmitted if g0(b) > 0 (respectively, g0(b) < 0),
4. the higher the probability of the patent being challenged in court, the less (respectively,
more) prior art information transmitted if g0(b) > 0 (respectively, g0(b) < 0).
6.2 Examiner￿ s optimal e⁄ort
As we know how the optimal prior art information transmitted by the applicant varies with
di⁄erent parameters of the model, we can now determine the impact of these changes on the
optimal e⁄ort of the examiner, evaluated at the optimal value b￿. We thus identify a direct e⁄ect
￿ for a given b, how the e⁄ort will vary after a change in one parameter￿and an indirect e⁄ect
￿ through the variation of b. We obtain the following results.
33Lemma 6 Whenever g0(b) < 0,
1. the higher the probability of a patentable innovation, the lower the optimal search e⁄ort of
the examiner,
2. the more talented the examiner, the higher his optimal search e⁄ort.
If g0(b) < 0, and ￿ < 0, there exists a positive b￿ and both indirect and direct e⁄ects reinforce
each other. However, if g0(b) < 0, and ￿ > 0 or if g0(b) > 0, and ￿ < 0, we ￿nd that b￿ = 0, and
only the direct e⁄ect matters. On the other hand, if g0(b) > 0, and ￿ > 0 we cannot conclude
as both e⁄ects work in opposite direction.
Lemma 7 Whenever g0(b) < 0 or g0(b) > 0,
1. the higher the probability of having a non-patentable innovation, the lower the optimal
search e⁄ort of the examiner if ￿ > ￿1;
2. the higher the probability of the patent being challenged in court, the higher the optimal
search e⁄ort of the examiner if p ￿ p1.
If ￿ ￿ ￿1, we cannot conclude as both e⁄ects work in opposite direction as p increases.
Indeed, an increase in p induces more e⁄ort from the examiner for a given b, but it also increases
b if g0(b) > 0 (or decrease if g0(b) < 0). On the other hand, if the probability that the patent
will be challenged in court is relatively high, that is, ￿ > ￿1 if g0(b) > 0, the search e⁄ort of the
examiner decreases ￿rst less rapidly as b￿ = 0 (because ￿ < 0). Then, as p increases, b￿ becomes
positive and the search e⁄ort decreases more rapidly as both e⁄ect go in the same direction.
Similar arguments apply to the impact of a change in p on the optimal search e⁄ort.
6.3 Speci￿c functional form
We now consider the following functional form
g(b) = 1 + b ￿ 2b
1
2: (21)
34As already pointed out, the exact shape of g(b) might be linked to the ease with which the
applicant can ￿nd prior art information. With this functional form, the cost function (1) has
some interesting features. First, when the patent applicant provides relatively few but pertinent
prior art information, it helps the examiner as it makes his search less costly. The patent
applicant provides information that helps the examiner to direct his research in the right stream
of research. However, as the applicant provides more information, it comes to the point where it
becomes too costly for the patent examiner to read it all, and to process all the information. It
does not help him anymore, it is making his search more di¢ cult. This relatively general function
captures the idea that little but relevant information is helpful, whereas too much information
does not help. With this speci￿cation, we can determine the shape of the optimal e⁄ort e￿
1 and
optimal salary S￿
1 as de￿ned by equation (6) and (7), respectively. Figure 1 provides a graphical
representation of the optimal e⁄ort as a function of b. For a given level of reward R, an increase
in the information provided by the patent applicant ￿rst increases and then reduces the e⁄ort
of the examiner. First, because the examiner will put more e⁄ort in applications with relatively
small amount of information, the PTO does not have to provide a higher salary. However, when
the examiner￿ s e⁄ort is reduced because the applicant provided too much information, the PTO
must rectify the lack of incentive due to an increase in b by increasing the reward R that is given
to the examiner. However, the increase in R is not su¢ cient to induce the patent examiner to
make as much e⁄ort as before the change. Hence, it is important to consider how the incentive
scheme of the examiner will a⁄ect the incentive of the applicant the provide information.
The more talented the examiner, the higher his e⁄ort for a given level of reward. Talented
examiner will ￿nd more easily invalidating information, and therefore it is in his interest to
intensify his search e⁄ort. However, the PTO does not need to provide extra incentives to search
for information and can thus reduce the level of reward R. Overall, the salary increases with
the talent as the e⁄ort increases more than the reward decreases. As the probability of having a
patentable innovation increases, for a given R, the e⁄ort of the examiner decreases. He has less
35incentive to search for information that might not exist. Therefore, the PTO must increase the
reward to restore the incentive to search. Overall, the salary decreases with the probability of
having a patentable innovation. Conditional on having a non-patentable innovation as it stands,
an increase in the probability of having a non-patentable innovation intensi￿es the search e⁄ort
of the examiner, for a given R. The PTO does not have to give more incentive to search for
information.
With the functional form g(b) speci￿ed in equation (21), both the examiner￿ s utility (8) and
the PTO￿ s bene￿t (9) have an inverted U-shape. Both of these functions are increasing with
the e⁄ort of the examiner, but the optimal e⁄ort will increase or decrease with b. The optimal
e⁄ort e￿
1(b) is also an inverted-U shape function of b. If only a few prior art information has been
transmitted by the applicant, the e⁄ort of the examiner is increasing with b. In other words, an
increase in b would trigger an increase in the e⁄ort of the examiner. On the other hand, if too
much prior art information is provided in the patent application, it goes the other way around
as an increase in b triggers a reduction of the e⁄ort. There exists a value of b for which the e⁄ort
is maximum, e b = 1 (see ￿gure 1). Therefore, an increase in b for low (respectively, high) values
of b, will increase (respectively, reduce) the e⁄ort of the examiner, and increase (respectively,
reduce) the bene￿ts for both the examiner and the PTO. In other words, in our setting, if too
much information is reported by the applicant, it will lower the scrutiny e⁄ort of the examiner,
and also lower his utility, even though the PTO increases the salary to compensate for the lack
of incentives to search for information. On the other hand, when less information is provided
but it is relevant, the examiner will make more e⁄ort and get a higher utility if the information
provided is increased, even though his salary does not increase.




￿￿[1 ￿ b￿ 1
2] ￿ c0(b) = 0:
With a convex cost function (e.g., c(b) = b2), we do not have a simple analytical solution as we
obtain a cubic ￿rst-order condition that has three roots, one real and two complex solutions.
36With a linear cost function c(b) = b, to get an optimal solution requires that ￿ < 0, and we





It is easy to check that b￿ < 1, and therefore g(b￿) < 0. We can also verify that the comparative
statics done in the general case are still consistent in this particular example.
7 Conclusion
Over the last decade, the quality of patent examination has often been questioned. It is well-
established that patents of questionable validity are issued, but there are only a few studies that
are aimed at understanding how patent examiners are granting patents. Having a better knowl-
edge about patent examiners might be a start to attempt to propose policy recommendations to
improve the patent system. It is nevertheless surprising that the internal organization of patent
o¢ ces has attracted little attention from economists. Only recently the process by which patents
are granted has started to be empirically studied and very little has been said in terms of salary
scheme and career concerns. However, there exists a signi￿cant body of literature on career
concerns, and on the study of salary within public institutions. To the best of our knowledge,
our paper is the ￿rst attempt at analyzing the salary scheme of patent examiners. Our aim is to
consider di⁄erent incentive schemes, and to investigate what is the impact of career concerns on
the behavior of patent examiners. We also analyze how patent applicants can shape the scrutiny
of patent examiner with the information they provide in their patent application.
We ￿nd that rewarding patent examiners on disposal of a patent case (rejection or accep-
tance) does not provide more incentive to search for information. Salaries (or bonuses) could
only be based on rejection. Furthermore, career concerns provide more incentive to search for
relevant information. Indeed, in order to be discovered as being a skilled examiner, a patent
examiner intensi￿es his search to make fewer mistakes. Explicit and implicit incentives push
patent examiners to make more e⁄ort and grant patents to deserving innovations. In fact the
37impact of accounting for the possibility that a patent might be challenged in court is (qualita-
tively) equivalent to let examiners have strong career concerns. When the uncertainty about the
patentability of an innovation is high, both a high probability of having the patent challenged
in court and reputational pressure push the examiner to intensify his scrutiny.
In terms of policy implications, our ￿ndings suggest that a salary (or bonus) scheme based
on rejected patents might give more incentives to search for invalidating information, and that
career concerns have a positive e⁄ect on the search e⁄ort. On the other hand, even with this
rejection scheme, a tough post-patent policy (in terms of more patents being challenged in court)
will induce the examiner to intensify his search e⁄ort.
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41Appendix
Proof of lemma 1
The proof consists in the calculation of the derivatives of the e⁄ort (6), the reward (5) and
the expected salary (7) with respect to the following parameters ￿;￿;b;p(1￿￿);￿. Most of the
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Proof of lemma 2
This proof is similar to the proof of lemma 1. We calculate the derivatives of the e⁄ort e￿
2,
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The ￿rst part is negative as @R￿
1=@￿ < 0 whereas the second part is positive as @
@￿(2￿
￿ ) < 0.
Therefore it is not obvious to conclude. For low values of ￿, the ￿rst e⁄ect is lower than the
second.
Proof of lemma 3
The proof consists in the comparison of the derivatives of the e⁄orts under the two regimes,
which is straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider G￿
1 and G￿
2 as de￿ned by equations (9) and (14), and let us rewrite G￿
2 as
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4￿ and therefore G￿
1 > G￿
2:
Proof of lemma 4
The proof consists in the calculation of the derivatives of the e⁄ort (17), with respect to the
following parameters ￿;￿;b;(1 ￿ ￿)p;￿, and to compare them with the derivatives of (6). We
can rewrite e￿
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Proof of lemma 5
Let us denote
F(y;b) = ￿
2￿g0(b) ￿ c0(b) = 0;




















< 0 if g0(b) < 0 and
db￿
d￿
> 0 if g0(b) > 0
44Proof of lemmas 6 and 7




















dy represents the indirect e⁄ect for y =
￿;￿;p(1 ￿ ￿);￿. We calculate that
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have been determined above.











Figure 1: optimal e⁄ort e￿
1(b)
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